Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) IPOs Through 2023

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Table 15: How Many IPOs Are There? Table 15a: IPO Volume and Average First-day Returns with Banks, LPs, and ADRs Included Table 15b: SPAC IPOs, 1980-2023 Table 15c: Post-mergers Returns on deSPACs, 2012-2023 Redemption Rates on DeSPACs, by quarter, 2017-2023

Table 15 (updated December 28, 2023)

How Many IPOs Are There?

The net number of IPOs excludes Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), closed-end funds, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), unit offers (typically composed of a share plus a warrant to buy a share), IPOs with an offer price of less than \$5.00, commercial banks and savings and loans S&Ls), companies not promptly listed on the Amex, NYSE, or Nasdaq, master limited partnerships, small best efforts offers (included in the other exclusions column), and foreign companies issuing American Depositary Receipts (6 of which are banks). 11 ADRs are missing a first-day return, and the "including ADRs" averages exclude them. SPACs that are unit offers are classified as SPACs rather than units. No CRSP listing refers to IPOs not listed on CRSP within six months of the IPO. CRSP covers stocks listed on Nasdaq, the NYSE, and the NYSE MKT (the Amex prior to May 10, 2012).

Some IPOs are excluded for multiple reasons. For example, some bank and S&L IPOs are also excluded due to not being listed on CRSP. The bank and S&L count includes all of them (other than ADRs).

| | | Numb of IP | | CEFs, SPACs, | Units and penny | | Banks and | No CRSP listing or | | <u>Includi</u> | n <u>g ADRs</u> Mean | |
|---|--------------|---------------|------------|------------------|-----------------|--------|--------------|-----------------------|----------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|--|
| _ | Year | Gross | Net | and REITs | stocks | LPs | S&Ls | others | ADRs | No. | return | |
| | 1980 | 234 | 71 | 1 | 56 | 0 | 0 | 106 | 0 | 71 | 14.3% | |
| | 1981 | 439 | 192 | 0 | 103 | 0 | 0 | 144 | 0 | 192 | 5.9% | |
| | 1982 | 198 | 77 | 1 | 14 | 0 | 3 | 102 | 1 | 78 | 10.9% | |
| | 1983 | 850 | 451 | 1 | 168 | 0 | 75 | 152 | 3 | 453 | 9.9% | |
| | 1984 | 518 | 171 | 4 | 139 | 1 | 47 | 150 | 6 | 177 | 3.8% | |
| | 1985 | 326 | 186 | 16 | 102 | 6 | 43 | 0 | 0 | 186 | 6.4% | |
| | 1986 | 710 | 393 | 28 | 183 | 20 | 100 | 0 | 1 | 394 | 6.1% | |
| | 1987 | 531 | 285 | 36 | 131 | 15 | 57 | 7 | 0 | 285 | 5.6% | |
| | 1988 | 293 | 105 | 74 | 88 | 3 | 30 | 0 | 5 | 109 | 5.4% | |
| | 1989 | 254 | 116 | 46 | 83 | 2 | 11 | 0 | 3 | 119 | 8.0% | |
| | 1990 | 213 | 110 | 43 | 55 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 111 | 10.7% | |
| | 1991 | 408 | 286 | 45 | 65 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 288 | 11.9% | |
| | 1992 | 602 | 412 | 105 | 80 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 5 | 416 | 10.2% | |
| | 1993 | 772 | 510 | 175 | 93 106 | 3 | 17 | 0 | 17 | 525 | 12.5% | |
| | 1994 | 594 | 402 | 85 | 106 | 3 | 10 | 0 | 19 | 418 | 9.5% | |
| | 1995 | 574 845 | 462 | 11 15 | 77 | 2 | 3 15 | 4 | 16 34 | 478 | 20.9% | |
| | 1996 | 845 | 677 474 | 13 30 | 104 | 5 | | 0 | | 710 | 16.9% | |
| | 1997 1998 | 601 379 | 474 283 | 30 39 | 63 20 | 1 2 | 15 33 | 0 | 34 13 | <mark>50</mark> 8 <mark>296</mark> | 13.7% 21.7% | |
| | 1998 | 565 | 285 476 | 39 37 | 20 18 | 2 | 55 12 | 0 0 | 13 26 | <u>290</u> 501 | 21.7% 69.7% | |
| | 2000 | 303 431 | 470 380 | 2 | 18 | 5 0 | 4 | 0 | 20 40 | 301 418 | 55.4% | |
| | 2000 2001 | 130 | 80 | 38 | 8 5 | 4 | 4 0 | 0 | 40 | 418 84 | 13.8% | |
| | 2001 | 150 | 66 | 81 | 2 | 4 6 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 68 | 9.0% | |
| | 2002 | 137 | 63 | 57 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 66 | 13.0% | |
| | 2003 | 304 | 173 | 95 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 2 | 16 | 188 | 11.9% | |
| | 2001 | 283 | 159 | 88 | 4 | 9 | 8 | 2 | 13 | 172 | 11.7% | |
| | 2005 | 265 | 157 | 62 | 5 | 18 | 5 | 0 | 15 | 172 | 12.5% | |
| | 2007 | 326 | 159 | 116 | 4 | 14 | 1 | 1 | 31 | 190 | 14.4% | |
| | 2008 | 53 | 21 | 22 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 24 | 4.3% | |
| | 2009 | 80 | 41 | 22 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 10 | 49 | 8.8% | |
| | 2010 | 198 | 91 | 37 | 9 | 7 | 11 | 7 | 36 | 125 | 12.2% | |
| | 2011 | 178 | 81 | 50 | 5 | 18 | 12 | 0 | 12 | 93 | 13.3% | |
| | 2012 | 175 | 93 | 46 | 4 | 16 | 11 | 0 | 5 | 97 | 17.2% | |
| | 2013 | 255 | 158 | 58 | 3 | 19 | 5 | 2 | 10 | 168 | 22.3% | |
| | 2014 | 305 | 206 | 30 | 10 | 20 | 19 | 1 | 19 | 225 | 14.8% | |
| | 2015 | 183 | 118 | 35 | 4 | 9 | 7 | 2 | 8 | 126 | 18.7% | |
| | 2016 | 113 | 75 | 18 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 9 | 83 | 14.1% | |
| | 2017 | 202 | 106 | 52 | 3 | 5 | 11 | 5 | 20 | 125 | 13.6% | |
| | 2018 | 243 | 134 | 52 | 9 | 1 | 9 | 6 | 32 | 166 | 17.1% | |
| | 2019 | 228 | 112 | 67 | 6 | 1 | 7 | 8 | 27 | 139 | 19.8% | |
| | 2020 | 465 | 165 | 257 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 32 | 197 | 38.3% | |
| | 2021 | 1,026 | 311 | 628 | 34 | 0 | 11 | 8 | 36 | 347 | 31.0% | |
| | 2022 | 175 | 38 | 91 | 39 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 43 | 54.5% | |
| | 2023 | 152 | 53 | 31 | 47 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 13 | 66 | 10.1% | |
| | m / 1 | 1 - 0 - 0 | 0 1 0 0 | | 1.0=(| | (00) | | | ~ | 10.00 | |

1,976

639

228

723

587

9,742

18.8%

Total

9,180

2,827

15,960

Table 15

Table 15a (updated December 28, 2023)

IPO Volume and Average First-day Returns with Banks, LPs, and ADRs Included

In the last two columns of the table, the net number of IPOs is expanded to include LPs, banks and S&Ls, and ADRs. Only CRSP-listed IPOs that have first-day return information are included, and therefore the number of IPOs added is slightly less for many years than if the "net" IPO count is added to the LP count, the bank and S&L count, and the ADR count. CRSP covers IPOs that are listed on Nasdaq, NYSE, and NYSE Market (formerly Amex). If a stock takes more than six months before CRSP-listing, it is not included in the count. The sample size of 15,959 IPOs from 1980-2023 includes the 9,180 IPOs from 1980-2023 used in most tables, plus 566 ADRs with a first-day return, 228 natural resource industry limited partnerships, and 577 bank and S&L IPOs (6 of which are ADRs). There are also 14 ADRs with a missing first-day close (1 in 1986, 2 in 1988, 2 in 1989, 2 in 1992, 2 in 1993, 3 in 1994, 1 in 1995, 1 in 1997).

As with Table 15, the net number of IPOs in the first column excludes Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), closed-end funds (not including interval funds), Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), unit offers (typically composed of a share plus a warrant to buy a share), IPOs with an offer price of less than \$5.00, commercial banks and savings and loans, companies not promptly listed on the Amex, NYSE, or Nasdaq, natural resource master limited partnerships, small best efforts offers (included in the other exclusions column), and foreign companies issuing American Depositary Receipts (6 of which are banks). SPACs that are unit offers are classified as SPACs rather than units.

Table 15a also differs from Table 15 in that the category of SPACs, closed-end funds, and REITs in Table 15 is decomposed into the three component parts. Blind pool offerings from the pre-2004 era were previously not included as SPACs, but I have recently added those from 1988-1997. These blind-pool offers are almost always screened out of the net number of offerings because they are either unit offers, penny stocks (offer price below \$5 per share), small best efforts deals, or were not CRSP-listed. The remaining blind pool offers are excluded in the "other reasons" category. A typical blind pool offering raised a few million dollars and investors never received anything in return.

The average first-day return on 580 bank and S&L IPOs is 6.1%, with a range of -20% to +57.5%. In most of my tables, I exclude Bank and S&L IPOs because, among other reasons, it is not always clear how many shares are sold to the general public versus sold to depositors and employees, since most of these offerings are demutualizations. Many bank demutualizations use best efforts offerings, and in most years I exclude these 200+ IPOs. The same can be said of some insurance IPOs, which I include.

The average first-day return on 566 ADR IPOs with a closing market price, including banks, is 16.5%, with a range of -37.2% to 414.3%, with the 2000 internet company Crayfish Co. Ltd IPO having the highest return, at 414.3%. In most of my tables, I exclude ADRs because, among other reasons, the accounting data is not always reliable (SDC sometimes makes translation mistakes) and the U.S. tranche may be a small part of a larger offering, especially in the home country of the company.

The average first-day return on 228 limited partnerships is 3.7%, with a range of -6.8% to +33.3%. In most of my tables, I exclude natural resource company limited partnerships because it if frequently difficult to discern the founding date of the underlying business, since most of these IPOs are spinoffs partly motivated by tax minimization strategies. Also, most of these LPs are created at the time of the IPO, and identifying whether the LP is profitable, what its trailing sales are, and what its assets are, is sometimes problematic. The same can be said of rollups, which I include. I also include newly created reinsurance companies.

Table 15a

| | Number of IPOs | | CEFs, SPACs, and | Closed -end | | SPA Non- | SPACs Non- | | Banks and | Including LPs, Banks, & ADRs | |
|-----------|-------------------|------------|---------------------|----------------|----------|-------------|---------------|--------|--------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|
| Year | Gross | Net | REITS | funds | REITs | unit | Unit | LPs | S&Ls | No. | Mean IR |
| 1980 | 234 | 71 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 71 | 14.3% |
| 1981 | 439 | 192 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 192 | 5.9% |
| 1982 | 198 | 77 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 80 | 10.5% |
| 1983 | 850 | 451 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 75 | 523 | 8.9% |
| 1984 | 518 | 171 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 47 | 220 | 3.1% |
| 1985 | 326 | 186 | 16 | 1 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 43 | 223 | 6.4% |
| 1986 | 710 | 393 | 28 | 25 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 100 | 497 | 5.9% |
| 1987 | 531 | 285 | 36 | 32 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 57 | 349 | 5.5% |
| 1988 | 293 | 105 | 74 | 65 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 30 | 136 | 5.3% |
| 1989 | 254 | 116 | 46 | 46 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 11 | 128 | 7.7% |
| 1990 | 213 | 110 | 43 | 42 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 118 | 10.3% |
| 1991 | 408 | 286 | 45 | 42 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 295 | 11.8% |
| 1992 | 602 | 412 | 105 | 98 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 420 | 10.1% |
| 1993 | 772 | 510 | 175 | 121 | 46 | 0 | 8 | 3 | 17 | 546 | 12.4% |
| 1994 | 594 | 402 | 84 | 37 | 41 | 0 | 7 | 3 | 10 | 432 | 9.4% |
| 1995 | 574 | 462 | 11 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 483 | 20.8% |
| 1996 | 845 | 677 | 15 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 15 | 727 | 16.7% |
| 1997 | 601 | 474 | 30 | 7 | 22 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 517 | 13.6% |
| 1998 | 379 | 283 | 39 | 24 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 33 | 323 | 20.6% |
| 1999 | 565 | 285 476 | 37 | 35 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 12 | 512 | 68.3% |
| 2000 | 431 | 380 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 420 | 55.1% |
| 2000 | 130 | 80 | 38 | 38 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 420 86 | 13.6% |
| 2001 | 150 | 80 66 | 81 | 58 77 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 80 77 | 7.8% |
| 2002 | 137 | 63 | 57 | 49 | 4 7 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 71 | 13.1% |
| 2003 | 304 | 173 | 95 | 49 55 | 28 | 0 | 12 | 5 | 8 | 201 | 11.9% |
| 2004 | | 173 | 93 88 | 55 50 | 28 11 | 4 | 24 | 9 | 8 | 201 189 | 11.5% |
| 2005 | 283 | | 62 | 30 22 | | 4 0 | 35 | 18 | 5 | | 11.3 <i>%</i> 11.4% |
| 2000 | 261 | 157 | | | 5 | 0 | 65 | 14 | 1 | 195 | 11.4% |
| 2007 | 326 | 159 | 116 | 47 | 4 | 0 | 17 | 4 | 0 | 205 | 4.1% |
| 2008 | 53 | 21 | 22 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 28 50 | 4.1 <i>%</i> 9.6% |
| 2009 | 80 | 41 | 22 | 13 | 9 | | 0 7 | 0 7 | | 50 | 9.0% 11.5% |
| 2010 | 198 | 91 91 | 37 | 22 25 | 8 | 0 0 | 16 | 18 | 11 12 | 139 | 11.5% |
| 2011 2012 | 178 | 81 | 50 | | 9 | 1 | 8 | 16 | 12 | 112 | 15.8% |
| 2012 | 175 | 93 150 | 46 | 28 | 9 | - | 8 7 | 10 | 5 | 122 | |
| | 255 | 158 | 58 | 28 | 20 | 3 | | | | 192 | 20.1% |
| 2014 | 305 | 206 | 30 25 | 13 | 6 | 0 | 11 | 20 | 19 7 | 261 | 14.2% |
| 2015 | 183 | 118 | 35 | 8 | 7 | 1 | 19 12 | 9 | 7 | 142 | 17.4% |
| 2016 | 113 | 75 | 18 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 13 | 1 | 4 | 89 | 13.6% |
| 2017 | 202 | 106 | 52 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 34 | 5 | 11 | 141 | 12.7% |
| 2018 | 243 | 134 | 52 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 46 | 1 | 9 | 176 | 16.4% |
| 2019 | 228 | 113 | 67 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 59 | 1 | 7 | 146 | 19.0% |
| 2020 | 465 | 165 | 257 | 5 | 4 | 11 | 237 | 0 | 0 | 197 | 38.3% |
| 2021 | 1,026 | 311 | 628 | 10 | 5 | 33 | 580 | 0 | 11 | 349 | 30.7% |
| 2022 | 175 | 38 | 91 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 86 | 0 | 3 | 46 | 50.1% |
| 2023 | 152 | 53 | 31 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 31 | 1 | 3 | 70 | 9.4% |
| Total | 15,960 | 9,180 | 2,796 | 1,099 | 341 | 53 | 1,334 | 227 | 639 | 10,496 | 17.9% |

Table 15b (updated March 8, 2024)

Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) IPOs, 1990-2023

IR is the initial return, measured from the offer price to the first close. Proceeds are in millions and do not include overallotment shares. For 1990-1997 and 2004-2007, 50 of the initial returns are missing for SPAC OTC issues. For SPACs from before 2010, data has been provided by Tim Jenkinson, Andrew Karolyi, and Milos Vulanovic. SPAC Research, Gritstone Asset Management, and Dealogic have been used as data sources for SPACs in 2015-2023. For 1990-2022, Refinitive (SDC) misclassifies over 140 SPAC IPOs, usually as closed-end funds (SIC 6726).

| Operating Company IPOs | | | S | PAC IPO | s | SPAC IPOs | | |
|-------------------------------|--------|---------|----------|---------|-------|---------------|---------|--|
| Year | Number | Mean IR | Non-unit | Unit | Total | Proceeds, \$b | Mean IR | |
| 1000 | 110 | 10.00 | 0 | 1 | 1 | ¢0.002 | | |
| 1990 | 110 | 10.8% | 0 | 1 | 1 | \$0.003 | | |
| 1991 | 286 | 11.9% | 0 | 1 | 1 | \$0.015 | | |
| 1992 | 412 | 10.3% | 0 | 2 | 2 | \$0.030 | | |
| 1993 | 510 | 12.7% | 0 | 8 | 8 | \$0.086 | | |
| 1994 | 402 | 9.6% | 0 | 7 | 7 | \$0.086 | | |
| 1995 | 462 | 21.4% | 0 | 2 | 2 | \$0.018 | | |
| 1996 | 677 | 17.2% | 0 | 4 | 4 | \$0.032 | | |
| 1997 | 474 | 14.0% | 0 | 1 | 1 | \$0.018 | | |
| 1998 | 283 | 21.9% | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| 1999 | 476 | 71.2% | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| 2000 | 380 | 56.3% | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| 2001 | 80 | 14.0% | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| 2002 | 66 | 9.1% | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| 2003 | 63 | 11.7% | 0 | 1 | 1 | \$0.024 | 0.9% | |
| 2004 | 173 | 12.3% | 0 | 12 | 12 | \$0.425 | 0.8% | |
| 2005 | 159 | 10.3% | 4 | 24 | 28 | \$1.846 | 1.9% | |
| 2006 | 157 | 12.1% | 0 | 35 | 35 | \$3.013 | 3.2% | |
| 2007 | 159 | 14.0% | 0 | 65 | 65 | \$10.985 | 0.7% | |
| 2008 | 21 | 5.7% | 0 | 17 | 17 | \$3.627 | 0.2% | |
| 2009 | 41 | 9.8% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| 2010 | 91 | 9.4% | 0 | 7 | 7 | \$0.513 | -1.5% | |
| 2011 | 81 | 13.9% | 0 | 16 | 16 | \$1.049 | 0.4% | |
| 2012 | 93 | 17.7% | 1 | 8 | 9 | \$0.475 | 0.0% | |
| 2013 | 158 | 20.9% | 3 | 7 | 10 | \$1.33 | 0.2% | |
| 2014 | 206 | 15.5% | 0 | 11 | 11 | \$1.56 | -0.1% | |
| 2015 | 118 | 19.2% | 1 | 19 | 20 | \$3.62 | 0.4% | |
| 2016 | 75 | 14.5% | 0 | 13 | 13 | \$3.22 | 0.3% | |
| 2017 | 106 | 12.9% | 0 | 34 | 34 | \$9.00 | 0.7% | |
| 2018 | 134 | 18.6% | 0 | 46 | 46 | \$9.94 | 0.4% | |
| 2019 | 113 | 23.5% | 0 | 59 | 59 | \$12.12 | 0.6% | |
| 2020 | 165 | 41.6% | 11 | 237 | 248 | \$75.34 | 1.6% | |
| 2021 | 311 | 32.0% | 33 | 580 | 613 | \$144.53 | 1.9% | |
| 2022 | 38 | 48.9% | 0 | 86 | 86 | \$12.08 | 0.1% | |
| 2023 | 53 | 12.2% | 0 | 31 | 31 | \$3.19 | 1.2% | |
| Total | 7,133 | 22.3% | 53 | 1,333 | 1,386 | \$298.2 | 1.4% | |

| | Number | Mean IR | | Number | Mean IR |
|-------|--------|---------|------|--------|---------|
| 1Q 21 | 298 | 3.7% | 1Q22 | 54 | 0.0% |
| 2Q 21 | 60 | 0.3% | 2Q22 | 16 | 0.2% |
| 3Q 21 | 89 | -0.2% | 3Q22 | 8 | 0.0% |
| 4Q 21 | 166 | 0.5% | 4Q22 | 8 | 0.5% |
| 1Q 23 | 11 | 1.6% | | | |
| 2Q 23 | 6 | 1.1% | | | |
| 3Q 23 | 5 | 1.2% | | | |
| 4Q 23 | 9 | 0.9% | | | |

SPAC IPOs by Quarter

Table 15c (March 25, 2024)Post-merger Returns on deSPACs, 2012-2022

This table is an updated version of Table 4 in "SPACs" by Minmo Gahng, Jay R. Ritter, and Donghang Zhang, published in the Sept. 2023 *Review of Financial Studies*. The table reports average equally weighted deSPAC period common share percentage returns based on a buy-and-hold strategy (Equation (3)) in which an investor purchases common shares of a merged company at the close of the first day of trading as a new entity (the deSPAC) and holds them for 1 or 3 years. The year column represents the year of the merger. The sample consists of 447 business combinations consummated between January 2010 and December 2022, after excluding a few deSPACs that were listed OTC rather than on Nasdaq or the NYSE. Returns include dividend yields and capital gains. When the full 1- or 3-year data are not available, we calculate the returns based on available data. For example, if a merged company started to trade in March 2020 and delisted in August 2020, we report the buy-and-hold returns from March 2020 to August 2020 for both one-year and three-year returns (not annualized). Returns end on December 29, 2023, a Friday. The CRSP return is the total return on the CRSP value-weighted market index, matched to each investment period.

For 2021 and 2022, the 3-year returns are for less than 3 years. In 2021, GNRS is not included because this deSPAC was traded OTC. For 2022, MLEC is not included because the deSPAC occurred on the last trading day of the year. Guilherme Junqueira assisted in the update of this table. It should be noted that if there is a high redemption rate, the public float after the deSPAC can be quite low until shares that were locked up become available for trading. For 2023, returns are measured from an assumed \$10 price to the Dec. 29, 2023 split-adjusted close. For two deSPACs in 2023, the market price is multiplied by 1.4 due to bonus shares given to non-redeeming shareholders. The return for a deSPAC on Dec. 29, 2023 is not included.

The equally weighted average deSPAC return would be similar if a purchase price of \$10 was used, since the average first closing deSPAC price is close to \$10. The average deSPAC return would be higher, however, if a public cash-weighted return was reported, because it tends to be the case that deSPACs with high redemption rates (low public cash) have worse subsequent returns. Also, some deSPACs involve side payments to non-redeeming shareholders, for instance giving 0.5 sponsor shares to each non-redeeming shareholder. For these shareholders, the effective purchase price is thus approximately \$6.67 rather than \$10.00, so their returns would be higher if the deSPAC return accounted for the side payment. If these shares were sold on the first day of deSPAC trading, however, the computations would not be affected.

| | | Average 1-year Return | | | Average 3 | 3-year Buy- | -and-hold Return |
|-----------|--------|-----------------------|--------|--------------|-----------|-------------|------------------|
| Year | Number | deSPACs | Market | Mkt-adjusted | deSPACs | Market | Mkt-adjusted |
| 2012 | 1 | -53.2% | 20.4% | -73.6% | -98.1% | 37.2% | -135.3% |
| 2013 | 5 | -30.1% | 17.9% | -48.0% | -41.1% | 28.0% | -69.1% |
| 2014 | 4 | -51.6% | 5.7% | -57.3% | -89.6% | 26.7% | -116.2% |
| 2015 | 9 | -19.5% | 0.7% | -20.2% | 87.7% | 33.1% | 54.6% |
| 2016 | 9 | -5.2% | 19.0% | -24.2% | -35.1% | 40.3% | -75.3% |
| 2017 | 13 | -11.0% | 11.7% | -22.6% | -44.5% | 30.3% | -74.7% |
| 2018 | 23 | -35.0% | 8.8% | -43.8% | -8.1% | 51.7% | -59.8% |
| 2019 | 25 | 2.0% | 8.8% | -6.8% | -25.0% | 10.1% | -35.1% |
| 2020 | 63 | -3.0% | 32.6% | -35.6% | -56.0% | 28.6% | -84.6% |
| 2021 | 198 | -64.2% | -10.3% | -53.9% | -73.0% | 7.0% | -80.0% |
| 2022 | 101 | -63.8% | 5.0% | -53.0% | -63.8% | 16.9% | -80.7% |
| 2023 | 98 | -59.1% | | | | | |
| 2012-2022 | 451 | -46.3% | 3.1% | -49.4% | -57.7% | 17.0% | -74.7% |

Table 11 (updated April 12, 2024)Redemption rates on deSPACs, by quarter, 2017-2023

This table appears as Table 11 in "Going Public with IPOs and SPAC Mergers" by Rongbing Huang, Jay R. Ritter, and Donghang Zhang in for *Research Handbook on the Structure of Private Equity and Venture Capital* co-edited by Brian Broughman and Elisabeth de Fontenay. The redemption rates are equally weighted averages at the time of the merger between a SPAC and an operating company. Source: SPAC Research.

| | All deSPACs | | VC-b | acked | Non-VC-backed | | |
|--------------|-------------|------------|-----------|------------|---------------|------------|--|
| | | Average | | Average | | Average | |
| | | redemption | Number of | redemption | Number of | redemption | |
| Quarter | deSPACs | rate | deSPACs | rate | deSPACs | rate | |
| 2017, first | 3 | 38.4% | 1 | 8.7% | 2 | 53.3% | |
| 2017, second | 2 | 36.2% | 0 | 0.0% | 2 | 36.2% | |
| 2017, third | 4 | 60.2% | 1 | 78.2% | 3 | 54.2% | |
| 2017, fourth | 4 | 57.8% | 1 | 91.8% | 3 | 46.5% | |
| 2018, first | 6 | 64.9% | 0 | 0.0% | 6 | 64.9% | |
| 2018, second | 1 | 8.4% | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 8.4% | |
| 2018, third | 5 | 41.8% | 2 | 14.1% | 3 | 60.3% | |
| 2018, fourth | 11 | 72.1% | 3 | 86.4% | 8 | 66.8% | |
| 2019, first | 6 | 73.0% | 1 | 99.3% | 5 | 67.8% | |
| 2019, second | 6 | 72.5% | 2 | 88.6% | 4 | 62.2% | |
| 2019, third | 5 | 74.2% | 1 | 96.7% | 4 | 68.6% | |
| 2019, fourth | 11 | 53.1% | 2 | 7.1% | 9 | 63.3% | |
| 2020, first | 10 | 52.2% | 3 | 64.9% | 7 | 46.7% | |
| 2020, second | 8 | 54.1% | 4 | 32.7% | 4 | 75.6% | |
| 2020, third | 8 | 56.3% | 3 | 37.5% | 5 | 67.5% | |
| 2020, fourth | 38 | 27.4% | 24 | 27.7% | 14 | 26.7% | |
| 2021, first | 24 | 11.3% | 16 | 7.0% | 8 | 19.8% | |
| 2021, second | 40 | 24.2% | 30 | 25.1% | 10 | 21.6% | |
| 2021, third | 82 | 54.5% | 62 | 52.2% | 20 | 61.3% | |
| 2021. fourth | 53 | 62.0% | 34 | 61.5% | 19 | 63.0% | |
| 2022, first | 29 | 85.6% | 23 | 85.5% | 6 | 86.1% | |
| 2022, second | 20 | 81.4% | 9 | 84.0% | 11 | 79.2% | |
| 2022, third | 26 | 82.2% | 9 | 80.6% | 17 | 83.0% | |
| 2022, fourth | 27 | 88.1% | 14 | 90.9% | 13 | 85.0% | |
| 2023, first | 28 | 94.3% | | | | | |
| 2023, second | 10 | 85.8% | | | | | |
| 2023, third | 29 | 93.8% | | | | | |
| 2023, fourth | 28 | 96.7% | | | | | |
| Total | 524 | 62.7% | 245 | 58.1% | 184 | 57.0% | |